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Foreword
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teenager, was shot multiple times and 
killed by Darren Wilson, a White police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri. This tragic act provoked 
grief and outrage in Ferguson and across the country. We mourned the loss of an innocent young 
man, taken before his time, and recognized that his killing was the latest in a long and rapidly 
growing succession of cases involving police use of lethal force against unarmed people of color.
The disproportionate, militarized police response to subsequent community protests in 
Ferguson—including the use of tear gas and snipers, curfews enforced by armored trucks and 
tactical units, and the unwarranted arrest of multiple journalists—further incensed the country 
and, in conjunction with Michael Brown’s killing, raised an urgent question:  
What must change so that not one more person of color is unjustifiably and indefensibly killed by 
the police?
While there are no definitive figures on how many Americans are shot by police every year, existing 
data point to grave differences by race. In 2014 alone, police were responsible for the deaths of 302 
Black people across the country.From 2010 – 2012, Black men were 21 times more likely than their 
White peers to be killed by police.1 Similar racial disparities hold true among those injured by police.2 
Local law enforcement units too often treat low-income neighborhoods populated by people of 
color—communities where people strive to live, learn, work, play, and pray in peace and 
harmony—as if they are enemy territory. Youth of color who should be growing up in supportive, 
affirming environments are instead presumed to be criminals and relentlessly subjected to 
aggressive police tactics that result in unnecessary fear, arrests, injuries, and deaths. This 
approach prevents police from being seen as trusted community partners, undermining 
neighborhood safety when coordinated efforts are most needed.
The militarization of police departments further erodes the trust that should exist between 
residents and the police who serve them. The proliferation of machine guns, armored vehicles and 
aircraft, and camouflage in local law enforcement units does not help police-community relations, 
the future of our cities, or our country.
To move forward, the country must also acknowledge and counter the effects of systemic racial 
bias, which impairs the perceptions, judgment, and behavior of too many of our law enforcement 
personnel and obstructs the ability of our police departments and criminal justice institutions to 
protect and serve all communities in a fair and just manner. 
In the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death, PolicyLink, the Center for Global Policy Solutions, and 
over 1,400 social justice leaders, congressional members, faith leaders, artists, and activists 
signed an open letter to President Obama, urging federal action through the Justice Department 
to improve police-community relations through seven principles. 
Soon after the letter was issued, the Justice Department launched the National Initiative for 
Building Community Trust and Justice. Funded with a three-year, $4.75 million federal grant, the 
initiative invests in training, evidence-based strategies, policy development, and research to combat 
distrust and hostility between law enforcement and the communities they serve. The initiative 
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brings together a consortium of national law enforcement experts, including the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, Yale Law School, the Center for Policing Equity at UCLA, and the Urban Institute.3  
Several weeks later, the Department of Justice completed its investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department, uncovering deep-seated injustice and racism in nearly every facet of the 
department’s practices. Soon after the report’s release, a Ferguson municipal judge and several 
Ferguson police officers—including Police Chief Thomas Jackson—resigned or were fired. At the 
same time, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing released a robust report, complete 
with thoughtful and comprehensive recommendations and action steps to help overhaul policing 
practices in a way that benefits communities.
While these represent promising steps at the federal level to advance “community-centered 
policing,” local efforts and leadership are also needed. The seven principles in the open letter to 
President Obama can guide actions by community leaders to help improve police-community 
relations and institute community-centered policing at the local level. They can help build mutual 
trust and respect, increase safety in communities, and minimize senseless killings and excessive 
use of force by police:
1. Ensure Transparency and Accountability: Police departments are funded by the public 
and should be accountable to the public. Therefore, police departments should not 
investigate themselves. Departments should establish enforceable, impartial accountability 
measures in instances where police brutality, racial profiling, and/or improper use of force 
are in question. This includes establishing effective and independent review boards broadly 
representative of the community, not just police interests. The actions, investigations, 
and publication of all relevant information, evidence, and policy recommendations of 
departments and review boards should be transparent and enforceable. Departments 
should also ensure that data and summary information are properly collected and made 
publicly available on particular incidents, progress, and trends that relate to suspected 
police brutality and racial profiling over the years for the department.
2. Invest in Training: Racial bias is real. Whether implicit or explicit, it influences perceptions 
and behaviors and can be deadly. Law enforcement personnel should be required to 
undergo racial bias training in addition to building skills that exemplify problem-solving 
strategies, conflict mediation techniques, and de-escalation tactics. Officers should become 
adept at being responsive to community needs and voices, and achieving consistency and 
continuity in engaging community while enforcing the law.
3. Ensure Diversity: Police department personnel should be representative of the 
communities they protect and serve. Therefore, police departments should adopt 
personnel practices that result in the hiring and retention of diverse law enforcement 
professionals who are culturally sensitive, speak the communities’ languages, and are 
residents of their patrolled communities. Departments should implement and monitor 
diversity hiring and retention guidelines to further community trust and partnerships.
4. Proactively Engage Communities: Too often, law enforcement personnel hold 
stereotypes about Black and brown youth and vice versa. Lack of familiarity breeds lack 
of understanding and increases opportunities for conflict. Police departments should 
work to deconstruct stereotypes and bias by identifying regular opportunities for 
constructive and quality engagement with youth and others living in the communities 
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they serve. Departments should therefore partner with our communities in solving and 
preventing problems before they occur.  
5. Reject Militarization: Police should not become an occupying force in our neighborhoods. 
Emergencies and terrorism are real concerns for our communities, but departments should 
not rely on military equipment and tactics to police everyday problems or peaceful pro-
tests. Departments and communities should reject the transfer of military equipment into 
local police departments.
6. Examine and Implement Good Models: It is possible to develop police departments that 
respect, serve, and protect all people in our communities regardless of age, race, physical 
and mental ability, gender, or class. Every department should partner with other local, 
state, and federal entities to quickly identify and establish new policies and practices to 
improve policing in communities.
7. Implement Technology and Tools for Oversight: Departments should implement tech-
nology that helps to investigate and hold officers accountable for misconduct, such as 
profiling due to a person’s race, class, religion, gender, physical or mental ability, or sexual 
orientation. The technology should only be used when legitimately apprehending suspects 
with probable cause, and all information gathered by the use of technology should be made 
publicly accessible immediately.
In 2001, PolicyLink and Advancement Project released Community-Centered Policing: A Force for 
Change, a report intended to help advocates, policymakers, and police officials understand 
models addressing the myriad challenges facing police departments, police-community relations, 
and the advancement of community-centered policing practices. With the same goal, PolicyLink 
and Advancement Project have come together once more to lift up solutions, this time with a 
series of issue briefs that will update some of the examples and best practices originally 
presented and explore critical new issues in the following areas:
• Limiting Police Use of Force
• Engaging Communities as Partners
• Demilitarizing Local Police Departments 
• Sustaining and Institutionalizing Best Practices and Strategies
The third brief, presented below, explores promising efforts to demilitarize police departments. 
We hope these new and updated briefs will be tools for community leaders to use in 
conversations with local police forces and policymakers that can shape new policies to help 
communities—including low-income communities and communities of color—become healthier, 
more vibrant, and safer for all to participate and prosper.
Angela Glover Blackwell 
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Introduction
A company of police officers in riot gear with raised automatic weapons advance upon a solitary 
Black man with his hands up—one of the most chilling and memorable images to come out of 
protests in Ferguson, Missouri, last fall. The world was shocked to see local police officers in full 
body armor, rolling down the streets of a small suburban town in armored trucks, throwing tear 
gas canisters and stun grenades into crowds of peaceful protestors. 
When did our police begin to resemble an invading military force? When did protests in the 
United States start warranting a military-like response?
Ferguson was a wake-up call that hastened numerous civil liberties organizations to speak out 
against police militarization—state and local police departments across the country amassing 
huge arsenals of military weapons, aided by federal programs that transfer weapons used in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, or issue grants to purchase them.
The widespread militarization of policing—hostile, authoritarian, and too often, violent—
represents the antithesis of community-centered policing and a marked transformation in the 
very nature of policing: Are police working to protect or control communities? Does a military 
response to non-violent protest increase community safety? Who are the police protecting when 
they use military equipment and tactics against communities?
The first two briefs in our Beyond Confrontation series advanced local programs and practices 
that exemplify police-community partnerships and agreements. Militarization, however, is a 
unique issue, fueled by an underregulated and overlooked federal policy that has flooded local 
communities with military weapons and equipment. Turning Back the Tide: Promising Efforts to 
Demilitarize Police Departments, the third brief in our series, explores the stark landscape of 
pervasive police militarization, and lifts up early examples of communities fighting to reverse 
the tide of militarization at the local level and restore a focus on community to local and state 
police departments.
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Overview 
Bomb suits, battering rams, helicopters, and surveillance and reconnaissance equipment—all 
commonly found on battlefields—are now available at local police departments across the 
country. Since 1990, under the Department of Defense’s “1033 program,” $5.1 billion of military 
equipment and weapons have been transferred to more than 8,000 police departments across the 
country.4 Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security has given out $35 billion in grants to 
state and local police departments, much of it to purchase military gear and armed personnel 
carriers.5 Between 2009 and 2014 alone, the federal government provided $18 billion in funds 
and resources to state and local law enforcement agencies.6
A review by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) found that 63 agencies received more than 
15,000 items of battle uniforms or personal protective equipment. Incredibly, 500 agencies 
received Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles designed to withstand roadside 
bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan.7 The Ohio State University Police Department justified the need 
to have an MRAP vehicle to provide protection at football games.8 In Keene County, New 
Hampshire, police said they needed an armored personnel carrier because the annual pumpkin 
festival was a potential target for terrorists.9 
Even schools are not immune. School districts in eight states have received AR-15 and M-16 
semi-automatic rifles, and San Diego and Los Angeles school districts also received MRAP 
vehicles.10 In the six California school districts that have semi-automatic weapons, the student 
bodies are predominately Latino.
“A mine-resistant vehicle isn’t a thing that exists for our safety. It exists for our harm,” said Laura 
Aguilar, a student leader in Los Angeles. “Why are we providing all these resources to the wrong 
side of education? A lot of us have already internalized it. It’s the norm for students. We’re being 
policed already in our communities, and now a second time in our schools.”11
Considering the kind of weapons being transferred, the regulations and restrictions are remarkably 
loose.  The federal government does not monitor the agencies to make sure they use the weapons as 
outlined in their applications.12 Local agencies only agree not to sell the weapons and to keep accurate 
inventories.13 Presumably as a misguided way to prove need, the 1033 program absurdly requires the 
agencies to use the weapons within a year, creating an incentive for military-style action.14
Further, oversight of distributed weapons has been lax.  An investigation found that 184 state and 
local police departments have been suspended from the 1033 program because of missing 
weapons, leading some critics to question whether the weapons were lost or stolen and sold on 
the black market.15 Far from being regulated, weapons can be transferred from one agency to 
another with no restrictions.16
Local agencies’ acquisition of military weapons also reinforces concerns about the “military-
industrial complex” first warned of by President Eisenhower. The Los Angeles Times reported that 
an entire industry is emerging to produce military equipment for local police agencies, predicting 
it would grow to $31 billion by this year.17 Rather than exclusively recycling weapons 
manufactured for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 1033 program has been used to bolster the 
local weapons manufacturing industry—the ACLU found that 36 percent of the equipment sent to 
local agencies through the program was newly purchased from manufacturers.18 
“A mine-resistant vehicle isn’t 
a thing that exists for our 
safety. It exists for our harm.” 
– Laura Aguilar, student 
leader, Los Angeles
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Militarization through SWAT Teams
The militarization of local policing has roots in the use of SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) 
teams to serve search warrants. SWAT raids—often for small amounts of drugs—are not 
announced as police actions. This intentional lack of transparency can lead to inhabitants, 
thinking they are under attack, responding in self-defense with weapons, increasing the incidence 
of and potential for injury and death.
The number of SWAT teams has grown nationwide, ostensibly to address the war on drugs and 
the war on terror. In the 1970s, there were a few hundred SWAT raids a year; in the early ‘80s, 
there were 3,000 a year, and in 2005, 50,000 a year (136 a day). Thirteen percent of small towns 
with a population of 25,000 to 50,000 had SWAT teams in 1983; in 2005, 80 percent had them.19
Communities of color are disproportionately targeted by SWAT raids. According to an ACLU review, 
42 percent of the people targeted by the SWAT raids were African American, and 12 percent were 
Latino. In 16 departments examined by the ACLU, African Americans were between 4 to 47 times 
more likely to be impacted by SWAT activities than Whites.
Although SWAT teams were initially introduced to handle extreme situations, they are now most 
commonly deployed for raids on private residences. According to the ACLU, 79 percent of SWAT 
deployments, “were for the purpose of executing a search warrant, most commonly in drug 
investigations,” and only 7 percent of deployments “were for hostage, barricade, or active shooter 
scenarios.”20 This invariably increases the likelihood of violence against non-violent suspects and 
non-suspect members of households.  
Police departments are not required to report SWAT and other paramilitary activities. Only 131 of 
255 law enforcement agencies responded to an ACLU public records request for information 
about SWAT activities, claiming that the information would reveal trade secrets or it was too 
costly to collect it. None of the responding agencies provided all requested data, such as 
information about those targeted, why a SWAT raid was deemed necessary, and/or the results of 
SWAT actions.21  
Because there are no reliable data collected and available about SWAT activities, it is hard to 
capture a complete nature and intensity of impact. However, the use of SWAT teams has had 
deadly and devastating consequences:  a 19-month-old baby in Wisconsin was severely burned 
when police threw a flash bang grenade into his crib. A 26-year-old mother in Ohio, holding her 
14-month old son, was killed when SWAT officers broke down her door and started firing. A 
26-year-old Iraq veteran, investigating noises at the front door with a rifle that had the safety on, 
was shot 22 times by SWAT officers in Arizona and died without receiving medical attention.22
Need for Community-Centered Training
Recruiting and training materials across the country show officers engaged in paramilitary 
activities, viewing the communities they are supposed to be protecting and serving as enemy 
combatants.23 Officers are often taught to develop a “warrior” mentality and “battlemind” ready 
for combat.24
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For example, in December 2014, the Justice Department issued a report criticizing the Cleveland 
Police Department for a pattern of “unreasonable and unnecessary force.” The report said police 
too often viewed themselves as an occupying force, as evidenced by a large banner at a district 
police station that called it an “operating base”—a military term for a secured outpost supporting 
tactical operations in a war zone.25
Some military experts have criticized the military actions of local police departments, pointing to 
the lack of adequate training for the equipment and tactics. Lt. General Russel Honore, the officer 
who ordered his soldiers in post-Katrina New Orleans to put their “weapons down, damn it,” 
commented on the police response to protests in Ferguson:  “Anytime we have policemen 
pointing weapons at American citizens, they need to go through re-training.”26 Furthermore, 
federal agencies supplying equipment and grants do not train local police agencies in the use of 
military weapons or tactics, according to testimony at a hearing on arming police departments 
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs.27 
The use of stress-based training for police officers—based on the military boot camp model—
versus non-stress training (a more academic style) has been debated for decades. Particularly in 
light of the move toward community policing, some are questioning the stress-based model. “…
The majority of police recruits receive their training in academies with a stress-based military 
orientation,” wrote Karl Bickel, senior policy analyst for the Department of Justice’s Community 
Oriented Policing Services. “This begs the question; is this military model—designed to prepare 
young recruits for combat—the appropriate mechanism for teaching our police trainees how to 
garner community trust and partner with citizens to solve crime and public order problems? …The 
warrior-like orientation seems antithetical to a community oriented policing philosophy that is 
grounded in trust building, partnering, and developing and sustaining positive relationships with 
citizen stakeholders that are integral parts of community oriented policing.”28
In the midst of this seemingly unchecked militarization of police departments, efforts are 
emerging to stem the tide.  
This brief, the third in the Beyond Confrontation series, highlights the following promising efforts 
to demilitarize police departments:
• Federal Action to Demilitarize Police Departments
• Community Action to Return 1033-Sourced Weapons and Equipment
• Transforming Police Culture and Training
“Anytime we have policemen 
pointing weapons at 
American citizens, they need 
to go through re-training.”  
– Lt. General Russel Honore
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Promising	Efforts	to	Demilitarize	Police	
Departments
Federal Action to Demilitarize Police Departments
Largely as a result of the public shock and backlash against heavily militarized police actions in 
Ferguson, Missouri, the White House has been exploring reforms to the 1033 program. In January 2015, 
President Obama created a working group to examine the 1033 program and recommend reforms 
regarding equipment training, limitations on types of equipment, and standardizing procedures. The 
working group will have 120 days for its review, and it will be led by the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General—other members include the Secretaries of 
the Treasury, Interior, and Education, and the head of the Office of National Drug Policy.29
In December 2014, the Executive Office of the President released White House Review: Federal 
Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition, which provided details on the programs 
that supported local law enforcement acquisition of equipment from the federal government. In 
its review, the White House explored whether equipment was appropriate to the needs of 
communities, whether law enforcement agencies had adequate policies to guide use of the 
equipment, whether personnel were properly trained and certified to employ equipment they 
obtain, and whether law enforcement had organizational and operational practices and standards 
to prevent misuse/abuse of the equipment.
The report found a lack of consistency in how federal programs are structured, implemented, and 
audited, and identified four focus areas to maximize the safety and security of police officers and 
the communities they serve:  1) local community engagement; 2) federal coordination and 
oversight; 3) training requirements; and 4) the community policing model.30
In November 2014, the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance and Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services issued a new guide to local law enforcement agencies that 
provided information, tools, and best practices to protect public safety and the right to protest.
The week after Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown in August 2014, 
Representative Hank Johnson (D-Georgia) introduced the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act 
of 2014 (HR 5478) that would restrict the kinds of equipment transferred under the 1033 
program, require detailed accounting of the equipment, and end the statutory requirement that 
the agencies use the equipment. As of January 2015, the Congressional Black Caucus is planning 
to offer the bill into the new Congress, as part of a package of Ferguson-related legislation.31
Community Action to Return 1033-Sourced Weapons  
and Equipment
Communities across the country have successfully pressed for the return of weapons obtained 
through the 1033 program. For example, after residents in San Jose, California, expressed 
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concerns, the San Jose Police Department announced the return of the MRAP vehicle it had 
obtained through the 1033 program. “We want the community’s trust,” said department 
spokeswoman Sgt. Heather Randol.32 The department also called two community meetings to 
discuss the acquisition of a drone, after residents questioned the lack of public debate or notice 
prior to its purchase. Davis, California, also returned a MRAP vehicle after community 
representatives objected to the militarization of the department.33
Local government representatives have also intervened to prevent or regulate acquisition of 
military equipment. In Neenah, Wisconsin, a member of the city council is backing an ordinance 
that would require a council vote to approve 1033 transfers. In Oxford County, Maine, county 
commissioners rescinded approval of the sheriff department’s request for an MRAP vehicle.34 
When Berkeley, California, city officials learned of a pending application for an Armored 
Emergency Rescue Vehicle, they canceled it. 35
School districts have also successfully returned equipment. The Community Rights Campaign 
protested the Los Angeles Unified School District’s acquisition of military equipment, leading to 
the return of three grenade launchers and transfer of an MRAP vehicle to the Barstow Police 
Department. As a practical consideration, the police chief noted that the cost of maintenance for 
the MRAP vehicle and of certifying a driver made it not “viable” for the department. Also in 
response to the Community Rights Campaign, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) agreed 
to provide an inventory of the military weapons it acquired. In Texas, where school districts have 
also received military weapons, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Texas Appleseed, a social 
justice organization, have requested the termination of 1033 transfers to school districts.36
Accountability created through reporting requirements can work to ensure procedural justice and 
to improve community relations with local and state law enforcement agencies through greater 
transparency. Local communities have also advocated for state oversight of federal programs 
supplying weapons to local departments, including uniform reporting of paramilitary actions and 
establishment of protocols for search warrants and crowd control. For example, after the mayor of 
a small town in Maryland and his family were held at gunpoint in a SWAT raid for two hours, he 
successfully led a push to change state law to require regular reporting on the use of SWAT 
teams.37 Utah has also enacted legislation requiring state law enforcement agencies to compile 
and report data on SWAT activities.38 Similar legislation has been introduced in Michigan with the 
goal of increasing public safety.39
Transforming Police Culture and Training
While the return of weapons and proper oversight are steps in the right direction, Peter Kraska, an 
expert in the militarization of police forces, has noted that a public examination of police tactics 
and increasingly militarized police culture would result in more substantive reforms than simply 
giving back the weapons. Reversing the militarization of police culture promises to be more 
challenging than the return of sniper rifles and MRAP vehicles, however. The culture exists on 
multiple levels, from recruitment to training to equipment.
The Los Angeles Police Department underwent a review of and a change in its training practices, 
moving from a repressive policing model to one that engages and works with the community. 
Luann Pannell, director of police training and education, called the new model a hybrid of stress-
based and academic training—one that advises officers to think of the people they are serving and 
Urban Shield—a multiday 
trade show and training 
exercise that attracted 200 
law enforcement agencies to 
the city of Oakland, Califor-
nia—was sponsored by major 
weapons manufacturing 
companies. A broad coalition 
of more than 15 organizations 
joined forces to oppose Urban 
Shield and organized the “No 
To Urban Shield Day of 
Action” in October 2013. In 
September 2014, Mayor Jean 
Quan announced the city 
would not pursue another 
contract with Urban Shield.
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to clearly communicate and review their actions. In the past, recruits sat in rows, at attention all 
day. Now they sit at tables and learn as a team, solving problems collectively. 
LAPD realized it has the same goal as the community—safe streets. “Communities are the 
greatest preventive factor,” Pannell said. This includes consideration of whether officers effectively 
used community resources, such as mental health agencies. The department also looked at best 
practices from northwestern states and Canada to develop cross-cultural education and training 
with an emphasis on diversity. It began to train officers to be critical thinkers, problem solvers, 
and community builders, including training in public speaking and communication.40
Local police departments could actually benefit from military training in crowd control. 
According to Jason Fritz, who served three deployments to Iraq, local police need to adopt 
military principles for crowd control, which include having respect for the crowd, establishing a 
dialogue with protest leaders, responding with the least amount of force necessary if the crowd 
turns violent, recording everything in the interest of everyone’s accountability, and not treating 
the media as the enemy.41
Military principles for crowd 
control include having 
respect for the crowd, 
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and not treating the media as 
the enemy.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
This brief outlined the scope of the pervasive militarization of local police departments and lifted up 
examples of communities that have worked to reverse the tide. It will take dedicated effort from 
community leaders, elected officials, and advocates across the country to build and expand upon 
these efforts. The following recommendations can be used as guidelines for comprehensive action: 
• The Department of Defense should eliminate the 1033 program, especially transfers to school 
districts and school district police. 
• At a minimum, the White House should regulate the program, including: 
 —implement standardized training and oversight over how weapons and equipment are used;
 —track transfer from one agency to another and missing items;
 —limit use of weaponry to actual terrorist activities or hostage situations;
 —change requirement that weapons and equipment must be used within one year as that 
encourages unnecessary use; and
 —limit the number and kinds of weapons and equipment that are sent to local and state police 
departments.
• The Department of Justice should require state and local governments to institute regular 
and standardized reporting of SWAT and paramilitary actions with detailed information about 
purpose, targets, and results.
• Local governments should establish a requirement to approve the acquisition of military 
weapons and equipment after public hearings and discussion. 
• Local leaders should press for the return of military weapons and equipment.
• Local governments should establish a protocol and standardized, regular reporting for the use 
of SWAT actions.
• Local governments should require police departments to obtain approval for non-emergency 
SWAT actions.
• Police departments should require SWAT team members to wear body cameras.
• Police departments should establish a protocol for crowd control that ensures the rights of 
protestors as well as public safety.
• Police departments should reconsider recruiting and training materials and practices based solely on 
stress-based models, shifting to recruitment and training based on community-centered policing.
• School district police agencies should return all military equipment and weapons.
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